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Abstract 
After the United States fought irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the amount of 
scholarship on the topic of counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare grew at a fast pace. Much 
of this scholarship has focused on a single conflict, or on several recent conflicts. This thesis 
took a different approach and looked at United States involvement in these irregular conflicts 
from the Philippine-American War onward through the lens of paternalism and the military 
strategies and tactics employed by the United States. The Philippine-American War was the 
first war the United States waged to maintain its overseas empire. This war would set 
precedents for many of the future conflicts fought by the United States. The paternalism that 
was present in this conflict would be present in many of the future irregular conflicts the 
United States was engaged in. Many of the strategies and tactics pioneered or implemented in 
this conflict were used in these conflicts as well. The United States’ use of indigenous 
populations as an auxiliary or primary military force was started in the Philippines and 
continued in later conflicts. The concentration of the civilian populace and the positioning of 
numerous small outposts among the population were strategies from this conflict that would 
appear in future conflicts. 
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 Introduction 
Before the Spanish-American War, the United States had concentrated its 
expansionist efforts on the North American continent by moving westward from the original 
colonies. Following the Spanish-American War, the United States became a global empire 
with territories in the Caribbean and Pacific. These territories included Puerto Rico in the 
Caribbean and the Philippines and Guam in the Pacific. While not comparable to that of the 
British, French, or other European powers, the United States was now an empire participating 
in the European tradition of colonialism that had dominated much of the world for centuries. 
The United States’ decision to acquire the Philippines was not made before the Spanish-
American War. Indeed, after the cessation of hostilities, the decision as to whether the 
Philippines were to become a territory or an independent nation was very much undecided in 
Washington. This indecision led to uncertainty in the actions undertaken by the military 
forces on the ground in the Philippines. The commanders on the ground were unsure as to 
how they should act and treat the Filipino revolutionaries.  
The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the Philippines by Commodore George Dewey 
and his Asiatic Squadron was ancillary to the primary objective of the United States during 
the Spanish-American War, namely to liberate Cuba. Even though plans were in place to 
attack the Spanish throughout their empire, the success of the attacks came as a surprise to 
many in the United States. These actions in the Philippines played a minor role compared to 
the conflict on Cuba during the war.1 The primary motivation for the United States to wage 
the Spanish-American War was the conflict in Cuba between the Spanish and the 
                                                          
1 David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 2007). Kindle Edition , 35. 
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revolutionaries on the island. Because the main objective for the United States was in the 
Caribbean theater, the actions in other parts of the world were of lower importance to those 
in charge compared to the campaign to liberate Cuba. With the focus in the Caribbean, the 
forces arrayed on the islands in the Philippines were minimal. This shortage made it difficult 
to adequately secure the territory and later fight the forces of the Filipino Revolution under 
Emilio Aguinaldo. 
Many of the actions undertaken by the United States government during and after the 
Spanish-American War went against what many considered the goals of the United States. 
Many believed that the United States could have annexed Cuba and eventually granted it 
independence.2 However, this was not the case, as the United States annexed the Hawaiian 
Islands and many of the former possessions of the Spanish Empire but decided against 
annexing Cuba. The United States kept small concessions in Cuba, such as Guantanamo Bay, 
and reserved the right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba if it deemed it necessary. The 
passage of the Teller Amendment, which specifically forbade the United States from 
annexing Cuba, discouraged the hopes and ideas of many by denying the United States the 
ability to annex Cuba after the island had been pacified.3 
This thesis will focus on the war that the Army wanted to fight and the war that its 
soldiers fought in relation to future conflicts. Rather than focusing on purely military aspects 
of the Philippine-American War, this paper will instead spend some of its space focusing on 
the motivations behind the orders and actions taken by the Army command in the Philippines 
and what the end goal of these actions were. Throughout the orders issued by the 
                                                          
2 Christine Skiwot, Purposes of Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Cuba and Hawai’i. (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010.), 5. 
3 Skiwot, Purposes of Paradise, 51-52. 
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commanders, it is apparent that the main goal of the United States in the Philippines was to 
“civilize” the islands and show the natives that the Americans were “representatives of a high 
civilization.”4 The United States government and its military forces saw themselves as 
bringing their ‘higher civilization” to these backwards islands and bringing the native 
inhabitants up to this level of higher civilization. The United States’ actions in the 
Philippines were paternalistic in nature, more so than the imperialism exercised by many 
European nations. For example, the British colonized India through the auspices of the 
British East India Company and used the continent to increase the riches of the metropole at 
the expense of the inhabitants of India.5 A notorious example of this type of colonization is 
that of the Belgian Congo, where the colony existed solely for the benefit of the king and the 
native inhabitants were infamously mistreated and abused in order to enrich the crown.6  This 
is not to say that the United States had not engaged in some behaviors that could be classified 
as a form of informal empire prior to the Philippine-American War. The United States had 
begun its imperial ventures by setting the standards for the unequal treaties that many foreign 
nations enacted with China during the nineteenth century guaranteeing the right to 
extraterritoriality for it citizens in China. This treaty would become the standard by which the 
other colonial powers measured their success in dealing with the Chinese and the negotiation 
of the unequal treaties.7 
                                                          
4 General Orders no. 3, 9 August 1898, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. 
Records of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942 Record Group (RG) 395 
e.765, National Archives Building, Washington DC (NAB). 
5 Nick Robins, The Corporation that Changed the Word: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern 
Multinational. 2nd edition. (London, Pluto Press, 2012), xii. 
6 Jenny Folsom. “Antwerp’s Appetite for African Hands.” Contexts: Understanding People in Their Social 
Worlds. Vol.15 no. 4 (65-67), 65. 
7 Teermu Ruskola, “Canton is Not Boston: The Invention of American Imperial Sovereignty.” American 
Quarterly,  vol. 57, no. 38, 60. 
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Even though the United States was not interested in pursuing colonization for the 
betterment of itself, the United States still colonized the Philippines against the wishes of 
many Filipinos and many people in the United States.8 Many of the official actions 
undertaken by the United States seemed to follow Rudyard Kipling’s The White Man’s 
Burden line, “Fill full the mouth of Famine and bid the sickness cease.”9 The United States 
undertook a massive campaign to eradicate smallpox and improve the health of many areas 
of the Philippines, and it also constructed a considerable amount of infrastructure on the 
islands and made education an important piece of the occupation strategy. Many local 
commanders even worked to prevent starvation among the natives under their supervision. 
Many of the strategies and tactics employed by the United States during the conflict harken 
back to one of the widely held cornerstones of a successful counterinsurgency campaign, 
control of the populace. By using benevolent means, the United States attempted to draw 
people to its side of the conflict. To use a term that is often misunderstood and misused, the 
United States was trying to win the “hearts and minds” of the people. This term does not 
mean that the people would be won over by using only benevolent and nonintrusive means. 
Instead, the people would either have their hearts won over by the benevolent rule of the 
United States or they would see that it was in their best interests to support the United States 
even if their hearts were with the guerillas. 
The prevalence of insurgencies and guerrilla conflicts in the modern day has sparked 
a great deal of interest in the guerilla wars and insurgencies of the past. While an attempt can 
certainly be made to gather knowledge from the past to better deal with problems of today, 
                                                          
8 Adam Cooke, “’An Unpardonable Bit of Folly and Impertinence’: Charles Francis Adams Jr., American Anti-
Imperialists, and the Philippines.” The New England Quarterly. Vol.83 no. 2. (313-338), 317. 
9 Rudyard Kipling: Complete Verse, Definitive Edition. (Anchor Books/Doubleday, New York, 1940). “The 
White Man’s Burden” 322. 
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the range of time between the present and the conflict covered in this thesis present some 
issues with attempting this approach. For one, the century or more that separates this conflict 
from today’s conflicts are two entirely distinct time periods. These different time periods had 
different circumstances on the international stage and different acceptable norms of behavior. 
Another issue is that the nature of past irregular conflicts is the underlying factors and 
reasons for the conflicts. Filipino insurgents waged wars of independence against the United 
Sates and before that Spain. Trying to put these past conflicts into the perspective of either 
the Maoist or Islamist insurgencies of the recent past or present is problematic because the 
influence of Mao’s guerilla warfare was not present, and the modern Islamist terrorism and 
insurgencies were not widely applicable. Also, the technology and knowledge of the twenty-
first century has changed how wars are fought and how they are perceived. The conflicts that 
the Philippine-American War most closely resembled may be the wars of colonial 
independence that were waged against Spain in Latin America and some of the later wars of 
independence waged against the other colonial powers. 
The conduct of the United States during the Philippine-American War was markedly 
different from that of the wars the earlier American Wars. Beginning with the American 
Revolution, the United States waged wars of extermination against the Native Americans, 
especially those that fought with the enemies of the United States.10 In the case of the 
Seminole Wars, the United States waged the wars to remove the native inhabitants to settle 
the land. The First Seminole War also resulted in the Spanish ceding Florida to the United 
States.11 The United States also sent numerous Natives Americans on the Trail of Tears in 
                                                          
10 Holger Hoock, Scars of Independence: America’s Violent Birth. (New York, Crown Publishing, 2017), 284. 
11 David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. Old Hickory’s War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire. 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2003). 
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order to remove them from desirable land and caused the deaths of many.12 These wars were 
not characterized by a desire of the United States to civilize and then colonize a people, but 
rather they were primarily waged to take the indigenous population’s land and use it for the 
gains of the United States. During the American Civil War, the United States dealt with 
guerillas throughout the conflict, but the conduct towards the guerillas and the civilian 
population was harsh. Reprisals were common, and much of the landscape was devastated by 
the marauding armies and the guerillas.13 Similar to the Indian Wars, the United States waged 
a brutal war against its enemies. The difference was that the people were civilized, and the 
United States dealt with adversaries already familiar with and practicing those values. Unlike 
the Philippine-American War, the United States waged a conventional conflict alongside the 
guerilla conflict. While these guerilla operations would be a major issue for United States, 
they were not the focus of the war. The guerillas forced the United States to utilize large 
numbers of troops to protect against guerillas and devote other resources and planning to deal 
with them, but they were not the primary focus of the United States.14 Rather the United 
States was focused on defeating the Confederate field armies and capturing the key cities of 
the Confederacy. 
In the case of the Philippine-American War, the United States took a different 
approach to warfare. After the United States captured Manila, the soldiers in the city 
undertook the task of cleaning Manila and bringing about the resumption of civil services.15 
                                                          
12 Sean Michael O’Brien, In Bitterness and Tears: Andrew Jackson’s Destruction of the Creeks an Seminoles. 
(Westport, CT, Praeger, 2003), 234. 
13 Daniel E. Sutherland, A Savage Conflict:: the Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War. 
(University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2006), 133-34. 
14 Robert R Mackey, The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. ( Norman, OK, 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 165. 
15 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Kindle Edition, 10. 
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After, the Filipino insurrection reverted to a guerilla war, the United States did not make 
reprisals and other punitive measures the primary means of dealing with a recalcitrant 
populace. Instead, the United States used benevolent measures as a primary strategy and 
punitive measures in a secondary manner. The use of these measures ushered in the use of 
similar tactics by the United States military when it dealt with other unconventional military 
conflicts. The next century of irregular warfare waged by the United States resembled the 
Philippine-American War in many aspects, especially the paternalism and the primary 
strategies used in these conflicts. This conflict marked a turn to a more paternalistic approach 
by the United States in future conflicts.  
When studying the wars and conflicts fought by the United States following the 
Philippine-American War in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the similarities and 
changes from previous centuries are obvious. During the Banana Wars, a series of 
interventions by the United States in Latin America from the 1900s through the 1930s, the 
United States used many similar tactics, such as the recruitment and use of local military 
units to combat guerillas. During the Vietnam War, the United States attempted to separate 
the populace from the insurgents and, in a limited manner, made use of small outposts to 
control the populace, just like the Philippine-American War. During the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in the twenty-first century, the United States would use many of the 
same strategies, principally the use of numerous small outposts and working with the local 
population to combat the insurgent forces. Throughout all of these conflicts, the United 
States also built infrastructure improvements. Another strategy that was common was the 
separation of the populace from the insurgent forces. 
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 When it comes to the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War, there 
is a solid base of literature. David J Silbey’s A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-
American War, 1899-1902 explores the reasons why the United States declared war on Spain 
and how the United States waged war in the Philippines.16 Silbey wrote about both the 
United States and Filipino sides and goes into detail about what each side was doing and the 
impact these actions had on the conflict. Another work that focuses solely on the conflict is 
Brian McAllister Linn’s The Philippine War: 1899-1902. This work is written to explore the 
conflict in its entirety from the Spanish-American War through the Philippine-American War 
and the numerous different locations where the conflict took place. Other works that deal 
with the efforts of the United States in the Philippines are Edward M. Coffman’s The 
Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941.17 In this work, Coffman wrote about how the 
United States military waged war in the Philippines and then transitioned itself into a modern 
army from the frontier force it had been. The Army had mostly consisted of numerous small 
frontier outposts scattered across the frontier.18 Another work of a similar nature is Brian 
McAllister Linn’s Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940.19 Linn 
explored the role of the United States military in the Philippines and the other possessions of 
the United States in the Pacific Ocean. Linn goes into detail about how the military was 
changing and attempting to deal with the problems of protecting an overseas of empire. Linn 
also went into depth about the different campaigns waged in the Philippines and how the 
                                                          
16 Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire. 
17 Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2004), Kindle Edition. 
18 Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846. (New 
York, Macmillan 1969), 354. 
19 Linn, Guardians of Empire. 
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United States military and the Philippine colonial government dealt with the irregular forces 
arrayed against it.  
One of the key themes that appeared in all of these works is the importance of 
political events and the influence these had on counterinsurgency operations. For example, 
Silbey argued that the election of 1900 had a profound impact on the Filipino Insurrection. 
After William Jennings Bryant lost the election, the insurrection lost a great deal of 
momentum. Because of this, many who were fighting gave up, turned themselves in, or 
started working for the United States against the Filipino guerrillas and Emilio Aguinaldo.20 
Silbey and the others also mentioned the importance of small unit commanders taking the 
initiative and being the ones who waged most of the war. These small units, platoons and 
companies, were the key to defeating the insurgency because they were the ones who had 
interactions with the populace on a daily basis and were also responsible for protecting the 
populace and fighting the guerillas.21 No matter the orders these individuals received from 
above, it was the actions of these small units and the men that constituted them that won the 
war for the United States. If these men had chosen to wage a more violent war with little 
regard for the civilian populace, it is very likely that the war would have turned out 
differently and the war would have been remembered far differently than it is now, if it is 
even remembered at all. 
Another group of works that deal with the counter-guerilla activities of the United 
States are works such as Max Boot’s The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of 
                                                          
20 Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire, 161-162. 
21 Ibid, 181-183. 
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American Power.22 In this work, Boot looked at many of the so-called small wars that the 
United States has fought, including the United States’ efforts in the Philippines during the 
Philippine-American War. Another work of a similar nature is Heart and Minds: A Peoples 
History of Counterinsurgency23 edited by Hannah Gurman. Like Boot’s work, this book 
contains a variety of topics relating to several wars. A final work that shares similarities with 
the two-aforementioned works is James R. Arnold’s Jungle of Snakes: A Century of 
Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq.24 Like the others, Arnold writes 
about multiple conflicts in his book in order to showcase the similarities and differences 
between them. One of the main differences between all of these works is the scope and 
reason behind their works. In the case of Boot, he wishes to show small wars have shaped the 
Unites States and its rise to power while Gurman and the authors in her edited volume 
attempted to show how counterinsurgency operations have affected the civilian population. 
Lastly, Arnold shows similarities between counterinsurgency operations and demonstrate 
how different counterinsurgency operations were waged in an attempt to show how effective 
different tactics and strategies were in combating guerillas and insurgents. While these works 
deal with the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War among other topics, 
only Arnold deals exclusively with the topic of counterinsurgency warfare, and he focuses on 
several different conflicts. Unlike the works of Linn and Coffman, this project will not focus 
on societal changes within the military or other topics. While these are certainly important, 
they fall outside of the scope of this research project but do offer tantalizing ideas for future 
                                                          
22 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace and the Rise of American Power. (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 
Kindle Edition. 
23 Hearts and Minds: A People’s History of counterinsurgency. Edited by Hannah Gurman. (New York: The 
New Press. 2013). 
24 James R. Arnold, Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq. 
(New York: Bloomsbury Press. 2009). 
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research on this topic. What differentiates this thesis from the work of these prior studies is 
that it takes the experiences of the United States during the Philippine-American War and 
extrapolates this to other conflicts through the lens of paternalism and the way the United 
States waged these conflicts. 
Many of the primary sources used in this work come from the National Archives in 
Washington DC. The material located there is voluminous and is an excellent source for 
those who wish to see the official records of the military forces that occupied the Philippines. 
The records used include the Records of the U.S. Army Overseas Operations and Commands 
contained in Record Group (RG) 395. These records include the correspondence and orders 
issued from the commander in the Philippines down to the individual outposts maintained by 
the United States. These documents offer a glimpse into the mindset of the officers and 
command of the Army stationed in the Philippines. The orders and correspondence show 
how the commanders wanted the war to be waged. The records also contain reports of 
operations and capture the way the war was fought by those at the junior levels of the 
military. These orders also give insight into the concerns of commanders and how events in 
the Philippines and the rest of the world influenced the decisions of the commanders in the 
Philippines. With the use of these documents, it is possible to see how the United States 
wanted to wage the war in the Philippines and, in many cases how the war was waged.  
These official records also mentioned the behaviors of the troops stationed in the Philippines. 
These include the exemplary behavior of the soldiers as well as the reprehensible behavior of 
others. These incidents demonstrate the differences between the war that the commanders 
wanted to wage and the war as it was fought by the individual soldiers stationed in their 
outposts throughout the Philippines. The utilization of these reports will help show how the 
Wike 12 
 
orders from superiors were followed and how the United States punished those who 
disobeyed them. 
 The first chapter of this paper will give the reader a general overview of the 
Philippine-American War. This chapter will serve as an introduction to the conflict and will 
introduce the many different strategies and tactics employed by the United States. The 
second chapter will analyze how many of the different strategies and tactics used in the 
Philippine-American War were also used in other conflicts waged by the United States. 
These conflicts include the Banana Wars, the Vietnam War, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These 
chapters will look at specific examples that show similarities in how the United States waged 
the Philippine-American War and these future conflicts. 
 With the recent past showing that the United States has continued to become involved 
in irregular conflicts, it is important to understand that the conflicts of the past may not hold 
the answers to these recent conflicts. However, these conflicts show us that the United States 
has continued to act in a similar manner as in the past. Even though the specifics of each 
conflict have changed, the overarching structures for the United States involvement have 
remained similar. 
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Chapter One: War in the New Empire 
 When the United States declared war on Spain in 1898, the concentration of almost 
every American was on Cuba. The primary motivator for the United States declaration of war 
against Spain was the conflict on Cuba raging between the Spanish and rebels on the island. 
Thus, when Commodore Dewey attacked and sank the Spanish fleet stationed in the 
Philippines, there was not a firm idea of what to do following the victory. Consequently, the 
forces the United States sent to the Philippines were small and lacked direction from 
Washington on how to proceed, and they were constantly on the periphery of the conflict for 
those in the United States and Washington.  
 When the first troops from the United States arrived, they joined the rebels 
surrounding Manila. After the Americans were in position around Manila, there was a lack of 
clear direction from President William McKinley.25 As the siege continued, the troops 
stationed in the Philippines lacked decisive direction from Washington. Instead, commanders 
received orders that lacked specifics on how they were to interact with Filipino rebels and 
with the continued Spanish presence on the islands. When General Wesley Merrit, the first 
commander of the expedition to the Philippines, finished meeting with President McKinley, 
he was unsure as to what exactly the president wanted him to do in the Philippines.26 Events 
took a turn when the army stationed in the Philippines assaulted Manila without the prior 
knowledge or assistance from the Filipino rebels. The assault was prearranged between the 
United States and Spanish forces. The Spanish forces put up a token resistance to save face 
and then abandoned their positions and gave the city to the United States while at the same 
                                                          
25 John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902. 
(Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press Inc. 1973), 4. 
26 Ibid, 5. 
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time the United States tried to prevent the Filipinos from gaining entry to the city.27 The 
Americans and Spanish wanted to prevent the Filipino rebels from gaining access to Manila 
because they feared the rebels would sack the city and mistreat the populace. 
 The assault on the city went off as planned. An artillery bombardment from the ships 
located in the harbor, and the field guns heralded the beginning of the Battle of Manila. The 
bombardment was followed by the advance of the United States forces towards the Spanish 
lines. As arranged, the Spanish forces put up a token resistance and then retreated to the city 
and surrendered to the United States.28 While the assault was planned with the intent to keep 
the Filipino Rebels out of Manila, many took part in the attack and took control over many 
areas of the city and the suburbs.29 With the capture of Manila, the United States was now in 
possession of the capital of the Philippines, but little else. The United States went from the 
besieger to the besieged over the course of a single day. 
 While the situation had changed for the United States forces stationed on the island, 
there was still a lack of direction from Washington. With the capture of Manila, the already 
tenuous relationship between the United States and the Filipino rebels became worse. 
Because Washington could not decide if the Philippines were to be annexed or given their 
independence, the commanders had no direction on how to deal with the rebels. They did not 
know if the army was only supposed to occupy Manila or attempt to capture the whole 
archipelago and subdue Aguinaldo’s forces.30 The Filipino rebels were decidedly perturbed at 
                                                          
27 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902. (Lawerence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 
23-24. 
28 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Kindle Edition,, 10. 
29 Linn, The Philippine War, 25. 
30 Ibid, 26. 
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the United States’ attempt to keep them out of Manila. This attempt contributed to the 
souring of relations between the United States and the Filipino rebels.31 With the United 
States’ soldiers stationed inside the city and the Filipino rebels surrounding them the 
situation developed into a stalemate with both forces waiting in the calm before the storm. 
Throughout this time of waiting, tensions between both sides were high and there were 
numerous instances where events threatened to break out into open conflict.32 
 After the United States occupied Manila, they found they city in disarray. Trash was 
lying in the streets, schools were closed, and the populace was on the verge of an epidemic. 
To combat these problems, the United States implemented the cleanup of the trash, opened 
the schools, and began inoculating the populace against smallpox.33 While these actions were 
certainly benevolent, they also served to keep the soldiers stationed in the city healthy and 
prevented the outbreak of civil unrest that the army could ill-afford to deal with at the time. 
The United States also undertook the trial and sentencing of criminals in the city. In one case, 
an “Anoto Lorente, did unlawfully and feloniously assault one Suprena Luxon, …against her 
will did ravish and carnally know the said Suprena Luxon.”34 For this crime the court 
sentenced Lorente to ten years of hard labor.35 Another civilian was tried during this time for 
“circulating seditious newspaper articles in violation of the laws of war.”36 The man, Antonio 
Hidalgo, was found guilty of all but one of the six charges leveled against him. For his 
                                                          
31 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 26. 
32 Ibid, 26-27. 
33 Anthony James Joes. “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 18998-1954” in Counterinsurgency in Modern 
Warfare. Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. (New York, Osprey Publishing, 2008), 44. 
34 General Order no.35 November 30, 1898. Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. 
vol 2. RG 395, e.765 National Archives, Washington DC.  
35 Ibid. 
36 General Orders no.38, December 17, 1898.. Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. 
vol 2. RG 395, e. 765 NAB. 
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crimes, Hidalgo was assessed a “fine of five hundred dollars in United States gold coin,”37 
and the sentence was later commuted to two hundred and fifty dollars by General Elwell 
Otis.38 The United States restored much of the civil functions of the city of Manila and 
undertook the day to day activities of running a city and imparting law and order. By doing 
so, the United States showed the populace that the United States was not the same as the 
Spanish who had ruled the Philippines but rather a more benevolent and paternalistic force. 
 Throughout the remainder of 1898, the United States and Filipino forces remained in 
a stalemate. Neither side was willing to upset the precarious status quo that had emerged after 
the Spanish capitulation of the city. Throughout the stalemate, the United States continued to 
reinforce its presence in the Philippines with troops arriving from the West Coast of the 
United States. These troops consisted of regular army units made up of professional soldiers 
who were generally well equipped and disciplined. The other units were made up of state 
volunteers made up of prewar state militia and volunteers who had joined after the United 
States declared war.  For example, “when Company B, 13th Minnesota, mustered 112 officers 
and men into service on 7 March all but 12 of the enlisted men were new volunteers.”39 
Unlike the regulars, the volunteers were not very well equipped. Instead, they were armed 
with outdated firearms and equipment, while many of the regulars were armed with the more 
modern Krag-Jorgensen bolt action rifle.40 While certainly an eclectic mix of men and arms, 
the United States forces were generally well disciplined and motivated, with many of the 
men and officers in these units having served in the American Civil War and the many 
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campaigns against the Native Americans in the Western United States.41 For example Arthur 
MacArthur had served in the American Civil War and reached the rank of Colonel. 
 While the mix of United States units may have looked inadequate, especially 
considering the lack of manpower and outdated equipment, the Filipino rebels were hardly in 
a better position themselves. Whereas the United States had a strong centralized military and 
political apparatus, the rebels lacked this strong consolidation of authority. Even though 
Emilio Aguinaldo was the titular head of the rebellion, he lacked power like those of United 
States military officers and the President of the United States. Aguinaldo constantly had to 
settle infighting among his subordinates and deal with their unwillingness to follow his and 
other officers’ orders.42 Not only was there a serious lack of discipline among Aguinaldo’s 
followers, his forces were even less well equipped than the United States’ military. Unlike 
the United States soldiers, the rebels had a motley assortment of arms that they had captured 
from the Spanish and acquired through other means.43 They did not have enough firearms to 
equip all their forces. The rebels also lacked sufficient artillery, which the United States did 
not.44 The one advantage the rebels had was in numbers. However, without the proper 
armaments for all their forces, the advantage in numbers that the rebels possessed was of 
little value against the far better equipped and disciplined United States Army. 
 Even though the rebels did not possess an advantage in material, or the quality of 
their forces one advantage, they possessed was that they knew the terrain. The rebels were 
also emplaced in defensive positions that the United States soldiers would have to attack to 
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break the siege and bring the fight to the rebels. The rebels also began infiltrating Manila to 
prepare for the battle over the city that was inevitable.45 By infiltrating Manila, the rebels 
placed their forces in a position where they could strike a blow against the rear of the United 
States Army manning the lines around Manila. For many armies this would have proven to 
be a huge advantage, but not for the rebels. Some of the units in the United States Army had 
been detailed as a provost guard inside Manila to provide policing and to counteract such a 
move by the Filipinos.46 Aguinaldo’s forces also lacked coordination so that when the battle 
for Manila finally came, they were unorganized and made little impact on the battle. 
 The mounting tension between both sides broke out into a battle on the night of 
February 4, 1899, when sporadic firing along the lines turned into a full-fledged battle after 
American sentries fired on a small group of Filipinos that had approached their post.47 The 
spontaneous nature of the battle meant that coordination among both sides was haphazard 
and lacking.48 The surprising nature of the battle benefitted the United States because the 
rebels that had secreted themselves into the city were caught just as unaware as the 
Americans. Because of this, the rebels’ actions were disorganized, and the provost guard 
within the city reacted quickly and decisively ending most of the threat posed by the rebels in 
the American rear.49 
 The United States forces were able to overrun the rebel positions and break the siege 
of Manila. Many of the attacking units had so much success that they were in danger of 
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advancing too far and losing the support of other units.50 These units also risked attack by 
rebel forces on their flanks and then being cut off from neighboring forces. However, the 
rebels were uncoordinated and incompetent when it came to taking advantage of these 
American mistakes.51 The United States forces were able to overrun the Filipino rebel 
positions with relatively light casualties, suffering sixty killed to the Filipino’s three 
thousand.52 This can be attributed to the discipline of the United States forces, and the lack of 
skill among the Filipino rebels, who were quite frequently reported as shooting above the 
heads of the approaching volunteers and regulars.53 Following the aftermath of the battle, the 
situation had changed dramatically for the United States and the Filipino rebels. Whereas the 
United States had been contained in Manila in a stalemate with the Filipino Rebels, now the 
momentum had shifted to the United States.  
 What followed the Battle of Manila were a series of engagements where the United 
States advanced against the Filipino rebels. In almost every encounter, the United States 
forces would advance against entrenched Filipino rebels and then defeat Aguinaldo’s 
soldiers. Despite the numerical superiority and with the advantage of defending fortified 
positions, the Filipino rebels were unable to defeat, or hold, the United States forces arrayed 
against them.54 Not only were the Filipinos incapable of defeating the United States, but with 
each defeat the rebels were becoming increasingly demoralized and fissures were starting to 
appear in their ranks.55 The Filipinos were also losing large amounts of supplies and 
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equipment to the United States with every loss; these could not be replaced.56 In successive 
battles, the rebels lost a great deal of their modern arms and the ammunition. In many 
instances, the rebels abandoned positions without bothering to take their supplies with 
them.57 
 After the breakout from Manila, the United States had managed to separate the 
Filipino forces between the north and those who were to the south of the city. These Filipino 
rebels were a constant problem for the United States because they threatened the southern 
flank of the United States forces in Manila and prevented more forces from being dispatched 
to fight Aguinaldo in the north, so the United States undertook operations against the rebels 
in the south. Because the majority of the available forces being deployed to combat 
Aguinaldo in the North,58 many of the operations conducted by the United States to the south 
of Manila consisted of limited advances against the Filipinos. After the advances, the United 
States fell back to its original defensive positions closer to Manila and abandoned the gains 
made because the United States lacked sufficient manpower to continue an offensive to the 
south of Manila in addition to the main offensive to the north of Manila59 
 The Filipino rebels were constantly wracked by internal problems and infighting. 
While Emilio Aguinaldo was the titular head of the rebellion, his authority was far from 
absolute. Because of this, he had extreme difficulty combating the United States. His 
generals and officers were often unwilling to listen to his orders and refused to obey many of 
them.60 Not only were his generals and officers insubordinate, his men were also 
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undisciplined. There were many reported incidents where Filipino soldiers abandoned their 
positions when the United States forces closed in on them and began to have any success 
during an attack.61 Because of these difficulties, Aguinaldo’s forces became demoralized and 
were losing territory to the United States with each battle. To add insult to injury, the United 
States captured Aguinaldo’s capital of Malolos as he retreated into the interior of the island 
of Luzon.62 Aguinaldo’s rebellion was also beset by political intrigue and mistrust among the 
officers. This mistrust led Aguinaldo to undertake many decisions that in hindsight proved to 
be ill-advised. One of these decisions was the execution of General Antonio Luna. He was 
arguably one of Aguinaldo’s most capable officers, but Aguinaldo mistrusted and feared 
Luna to such a degree that it is believed Aguinaldo had him murdered by his personal 
bodyguard.63 
 Even though Aguinaldo was the leader of the Filipino rebellion, he lacked authority 
over any rebel forces that were not under his direct control on the island of Luzon. Even 
though many of the rebels on neighboring islands were pledged to him, they would make 
their own decisions despite the orders they received from Aguinaldo.64 In an attempt to 
control these groups, Aguinaldo sent advisors to train and keep the disparate rebel groups 
under his control. However, because of the difficulty in communication, Aguinaldo had 
difficulty sending orders and then ensuring that they were followed. This communications 
problem was exacerbated in later years when Aguinaldo could only communicate by using 
messengers after the conflict had turned into a guerilla war.65  Also, because Aguinaldo 
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focused on fighting the United States forces that were arrayed against him in Manila and 
Luzon, he did not have the time nor manpower to see that his orders were followed on the 
other islands. 
 After suffering numerous defeats at the hands of the United States throughout the 
campaigning season of 1899, Aguinaldo was faced with the realization that he could not win 
a war against the United States in a conventional manner. Instead, Aguinaldo believed he had 
to wage a guerilla campaign that would draw out the conflict and hopefully result in a victory 
for the rebellion by tiring out the United States and turning the United States populace 
against the war.66 With this decision, Aguinaldo gave up any direct control he had over the 
rebellion. What little authority he had was gone, and now he would have to rule on the run 
from the United States and through unreliable communications. 
 The communications and command problems that beset Aguinaldo were in large part 
due to the terrain on the Islands of the Philippines. There were very few roads, and those that 
existed were often little more than paths through the countryside and jungle.67 While the 
terrain hampered Aguinaldo, it also hampered the United States forces that worked to defeat 
the rebellion. The maps the United States used did not accurately portray the terrain that the 
military would encounter, and it was often far more difficult to traverse than the commanders 
were led to believe.68 Each advance by the United States required the buildup of supplies 
before the operation could commence, and these supplies had to be transported over the 
almost nonexistent roads or the main railway system.69 In addition to being slowed by the 
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terrain, the army suffered many casualties due to sickness and exhaustion. For example, 
“when MacArthur’s 2nd Division finished one twenty-day campaign… 2,600 of its 4,800 
soldiers were on sick report.”70 The advances taken by the army took far longer than 
expected and resulted in many casualties from disease and exhaustion. These hardships 
caused missed opportunities that might have led to Aguinaldo’s capture, or dealt serious 
blows to the rebels.71 Shortly after Aguinaldo launched the guerilla campaign, the United 
States attempted to capture him as he retreated towards the mountainous interior of Luzon. 
The plan involved multiple forces that would attempt to encircle Aguinaldo and his army to 
prevent his escape into the mountains.72 However, when the forces marched out, they 
encountered difficult terrain that prevented them from encircling Aguinaldo, and while they 
were pursuing Aguinaldo and his men, they ran into a rear guard that slowed down the 
pursuit enough so that Aguinaldo escaped into the mountains.73 
 The lack of infrastructure in the Philippines prompted the United States to undertake 
the construction of roads and telegraph lines throughout the islands to increase their mobility, 
and to improve communications.74  Nearly every major outpost was connected by telegraph 
and received numerous reports ranging from the mundane to important.75 Because of the 
importance of these telegraph lines to the United States military, they were a constant target 
of the Filipino rebels. The cutting and destruction of telegraph wires by the rebels were such 
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a problem that those who were caught undertaking such an endeavor were severely punished 
for doing so including execution.76  
 Even though the United States was focused almost entirely on the island of Luzon, 
this did not mean that the other islands in the Philippines had been neglected. Soon after the 
United States had sizeable forces in the Philippines, soldiers were sent to the other major 
islands. These islands included Negros and Panay along with other islands in the Visayas.77 
These forces encountered similar problems to the United States forces stationed in Manila in 
that they lacked the numbers necessary to defeat their Filipino adversaries and were instead 
confined to little more than the major population areas they controlled. Because of this, they 
were only able to haphazardly implement the plans McKinley and the United States’ 
government had for the islands.78 Merritt dispatched the first of these troops to take control of 
the major port of Iloilo City on the island of Iloilo. They arrived to find that the port had 
already fallen to the Filipino rebels.79 Because of the lack of clear direction from the 
executive branch of the United States government, the forces stayed on their ships because 
the rebels had refused to surrender the city to the United States without direction from 
Aguinaldo’s government.80 After hostilities began between the rebels and the United States 
forces in Manila in February1899, the expeditionary forces undertook a landing against the 
rebels in the port. As the United States forces conducted their amphibious assault on the port, 
the city erupted into flames.81 There is some debate as to who set fire to the port. The United 
States claimed that it was the rebels, whereas the rebels claimed that it was the invading 
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United States forces that did so. The most likely explanation is that the fire was caused by 
both parties in their efforts to either capture or defend the city during the battle.82  
 In other islands throughout the Philippines, the United States sent soldiers to take 
control of these areas and enforce the authority of the United States over the native 
inhabitants. Each of these locations varied in their reactions to the United States. On Negros, 
the United States met with approval from many of the locals who formed a government that 
helped the United States rule the island and was seen by many as an example of how the 
United States could rule the Philippines.83 On other islands, the United States encountered a 
great deal of resistance to their arrival and rule, such as on Iloilo.84 While these islands were 
not the focus of the United States, they were nonetheless important to the overall goal of 
defeating the rebels in the Philippines.  
The most famous of these was the final operation to capture Aguinaldo.85 This 
mission was undertaken by a small group of United Sates military officers who relied on the 
native scouts to deceive Aguinaldo into believing that the officers had been captured and that 
the Filipino scouts were reinforcements sent to Aguinaldo by one of his officers.86 The 
detachment landed on a remote part of the coast and then marched through the jungle to 
Aguinaldo’s hideout. Once the detachment reached Aguinaldo, an honor guard of 
Aguinaldo’s men awaited the detachment expecting them to be the prisoners and 
reinforcements that were promised. When the United States officers were led into 
Aguinaldo’s headquarters, the officers sprung the trap and arrested Aguinaldo and took him 
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through the jungle to be picked up by the Navy.87 With the capture of Aguinaldo, the United 
States scored a major psychological victory over the insurgents, and many insurgents 
surrendered after hearing the news. Others surrendered after learning that Aguinaldo had 
pledged allegiance to the United States and had asked for his men to surrender to the United 
States. The capture of Aguinaldo also coincided with a general breakdown of the insurgency 
against the United States.88 While certainly not the primary reason for the collapse of the 
insurgency, the capture of Aguinaldo was nevertheless an important victory for the United 
States. By keeping Aguinaldo alive the United States was able to get many insurgents to 
surrender because Aguinaldo told them to do so. Instead of executing Aguinaldo the United 
States showed the Filipinos that they were more benevolent than the Spanish, by sparing 
Aguinaldo and showing that the United States was willing to work with native people instead 
of attempting to fight them and rule them in a totalitarian manner. 
 After the United States had forced Aguinaldo to change from a conventional conflict 
to a guerilla conflict, it took time for the United States forces to adapt to this new conflict. 
The first efforts by the United States were haphazard and lacked a cohesion. Soon the United 
States developed a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy that ultimately wore down and 
defeated the rebels. One of the key features of this strategy was the use of numerous small 
outposts placed throughout the islands to exert authority and control over the populace.  This 
strategy also served to protect those loyal to the United States from retaliation by the 
insurgents. As the conflict continued  the number of outposts grew consistently until there 
were hundreds of them scattered throughout the Philippines.89  One of these outposts was 
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created when “2nd Lieutenant F. Pratt, 1st Infantry,” was ordered  “with [a] detachment 50 
men Co, ‘L’ 1st Infantry, fifteen native police, thirty caragadores [porters], and five prisoners, 
to proceed to Coradosa on the Mondiagon River and establish a base there.”90 Each of these 
outposts were only manned by a small number of soldiers who were, for all intents and 
purposes, operating independently of most authority. These outposts were not only 
responsible for projecting the military power and authority of the United States, they were 
also tasked with more mundane administrative tasks. These included running the local 
governments, undertaking infrastructure projects, operating the customs and tax apparatuses, 
and instructing at the local schools.91 In the Visayas, the outpost commanders were directed 
that “a book of ‘Individual Histories’ shall be kept, in which shall be entered in a systematic 
manner the names of such persons, their family relations, their political connections, 
vocation, and financial standing.”92 By keeping records of individuals, the military had a 
more accurate picture of the populace they were dealing with, and this information would 
allow them to better fight the insurgents by having information available on who belonged in 
the towns and villages, as well as who to question if an individual was suspected of being an 
insurgent.  
 As the expedition in the preceding paragraph mentioned, 2nd Lieutenant Pratt went 
out with a contingent of native police. The United States would use large numbers of the 
indigenous populace to augment their own forces in the form of scouts raised to support the 
United States military stationed throughout the islands. These forces served to increase the 
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limited forces sent to the Philippines. Even though the United States raised large numbers of 
indigenous soldiers, they were never the main fighting force during the Philippine-American 
War. These scouts were also invaluable because they knew the culture of the civilian 
populace and had connections among the populace that could be used to gather intelligence.93 
While they were never the main fighting force, the Filipino Scouts were often used by the 
United States on the islands. Many patrols like the one Lieutenant Pratt led were made up of 
a combination of Filipino Scouts and soldiers. For example, one patrol consisted of “a 
detachment consisting of…15 enlisted men of Company ‘L’ 1st Infty 20 Ilocano 
Scouts…under command of Captain N.L. Jackson 1st Inftyt.”94  The communications sent to 
many outposts detailed the number of men that were to embark on patrols and expeditions. 
The patrol dispatched above commanded by Captain Jackson completed its mission along 
with detachments from other units. The results of the operation were chronicled in Captain 
Jackson’s report. One detachment of native scouts was responsible for “thirteen natives 
killed, 1 wounded, three men and three women captured, 36 houses destroyed, 400 cabanas 
rice, 46 carabaos killed.”95 The expedition that Captain Jackson personally led “captured 7 
bolomen three of whom were vigilancias of  Lukban’s for the Catarman, Bobon and Carainan 
District.”96 The Native Scouts performed well on this expedition, and the expedition was 
successful in destroying many stores of the insurgents as well as killing and capturing many 
others. 
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 Besides using the scouts on many missions, the United States routinely increased the 
number of scouts. Many commanders wanted more Scouts, but there was a lack of action on 
this from the command in Manila. It took much prodding before General Arthur MacArthur 
increased the number of scouts that had been begun under his predecessor Elwell Otis.97 
After this, the size of the scouts were steadily increased. In one letter, the quartermaster at 
Calbayog was authorized to employ “fifteen (15) native scouts at $15.max, and one (1) Chief 
of scouts at $30.00 max…he [the general issuing the orders] may authorize an increase of the 
number allowed to thirty (30).”98 As explained above, the increase in the size of the 
indigenous scouts was an integral to the United States’ strategy and served to increase the 
capabilities of the limited forces stationed in the Philippines. 
 As well as managing the mundane day to day activities, the outposts frequently sent 
men out on patrols to protect the populace. One of these patrols guarded a group of locals 
that gathered hemp.99 This patrol highlighted the importance that was placed on protecting 
the local populace and providing economic security to the populace. If the civilian population 
was able to support themselves economically, they would be less likely to challenge the 
United States. If the civilians were protected from the insurgents, then the civilians would be 
more willing to assist the United States without fear of reprisal from the insurgents.  Other 
patrols were sent to capture specific insurgents whose location had become known.100 By 
capturing the leaders, the insurgents lost their commanders and any men that were with the 
leader, depriving the insurgents of men and reducing the effectiveness of the insurgents. 
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Other patrols were sent out simply to project the presence of the United States and undertake 
actions against the insurgents that were operating in the area.101 By sending out these patrols, 
the United States showed the people and the insurgents that they could move around the area 
at will. If the insurgents decided to engage the patrol, they would have to pit their limited 
strength against that of the well-armed patrols. If the attack failed, the insurgents lost many 
of their men to the patrol and weakened themselves as well as showing the populace that they 
were incapable of defeating the Americans. 
The men in charge of the outposts were also responsible for ensuring the proper 
health of the local inhabitants. Commanders in charge of these outposts requested supplies 
and food to be shipped to the towns and ports to keep them supplied. One officer requested 
that “a small steamer loaded with two thousand sacks of rice and a reasonable quantity of 
salt, at the port of Manila for Catbalogan. The stores of rice are almost exhausted at this 
place.”102 When permission was granted for these provisions to be shipped the commanders 
were often ordered to sell the rice at a reasonable price to ensure profit for the firms 
undertaking the shipping of the rice. One commander was ordered to keep the rice “stored 
[so] that you can supervise and regulate its sale. It will be sold at a price fixed by you, 
allowing a reasonable profit to the agents, and only to such persons and in such quantities as 
you may designate.”103 The commanders of these outposts were tasked with regulatory 
affairs that would have normally been under the purview of civilian officials. By setting the 
price of the rice, the outpost commander would prevent the price from being extremely high, 
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while still protecting those who were undertaking the risk of shipping the rice. By performing 
this action, the men in charge were able to ensure the people could afford to feed themselves 
and promote the economy on a small local scale. To keep tight control over the movement of 
supplies and food, the ships that the food was being transported on were required to be 
named.104 Reports were also requested of the progress of these ships to ensure they were not 
transporting any items that would assist the Filipino rebels.105 By controlling to whom the 
rice was sold, the commanders could prevent insurgents or known insurgent sympathizers 
from gathering rice to send to the insurgents. 
In addition to policing and looking after the civilian population, the United States also 
policed its own men. A sergeant was investigated on the Island of Samar for misconduct in 
his dealings with a merchant. In this instance, a Sergeant Martin detained a merchant at his 
post for attempting to trade at a closed port. This merchant “was induced to sell his cargo, 
which he asserts cost Seven Hundred Pesos at Manila, to Sergeant Martin, or to his so-called 
“wife”, a Filipina girl, for Four Hundred Pesos rather than lose all.” Sergeant Martin or his 
wife then proceeded to sell the part of the cargo. A 2nd lieutenant intervened and confiscated 
the cargo, the proceeds from Sergeant Martin’s sales and the money paid to the merchant. 
Sergeant Martin was detained and the second lieutenant was able to determine that the 
merchant’s story about being moved off course by the wind and currents was plausible, and 
therefore, it was determined that the merchant was not trying to break the blockade around 
the Island of Samar. This episode showed that the United States was not only interested in 
bringing justice and law and order to the Philippines and the inhabitants of the Island but also 
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in holding its own soldiers to the same or higher standards. In addition to holding its soldiers 
to a higher standard the United States also treated the inhabitants with respect and fairness in 
legal proceedings 106 
 While the aforementioned strategy and policies were benevolent in nature, the United 
States also undertook many strategies and actions that were less benevolent, even malevolent 
in some respects. One of the actions undertaken by the United States was the institution of 
the policy of concentration. This policy came about in the areas that were most resilient to 
efforts of the United State to pacify them. This strategy involved forcibly removing the 
populace from their homes and concentrating them into areas where they could be controlled 
and separated from the insurgents.107 This strategy was ultimately effective, but it inflicted a 
great deal of hardship on the civilian populace that was forced into the concentration areas. 
This strategy succeeded because it deprived the insurgents of support from the populace and 
the supplies they needed. While the civilian populace was relocated into areas that were 
under the direct supervision of the United States, there were some problems with 
concentration. One of the major issues with the concentration of the populace was disease, 
especially cholera.108 While the United States soldiers were under strict orders to boil all their 
water, food, cookware, and utensils, which was effective in combating the disease, the 
civilians were far less fortunate.109 Many civilians died because of the use of concentration as 
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a strategy, and this caused the policy to receive a great deal of negative press and a negative 
reputation.110 
While the populace was under the direct control of the United States military, this 
allowed the United States to patrol the uninhabited areas and hunt the insurgents. Any male 
that was outside of the concentration camps was to be arrested and shot if they resisted. The 
patrols also destroyed any caches of supplies that they encountered.111 This strategy deprived 
the insurgents of supplies by preventing the populace from giving the insurgents supplies and 
destroying any supplies that were found outside the concentration areas. By denying the 
insurgents food and supplies, concentration forced the insurgents to spend more time and 
resources looking for these necessities and less time fighting the United States. Without food, 
the insurgents were unable to sustain themselves and offer an effective resistance to the 
United States beginning the end of insurgent activity in these areas.112 
 Another tactic employed by many United States soldiers was the use of the water cure 
and other torture techniques on insurgents and suspected insurgents. The water cure involved 
forcing water into an individual’s stomach until he “became distended. The interrogators 
forced the water out by kicking the victim. Then they filled him with water again.”113 The use 
of the water cure and other torture techniques placed a black mark on the United States 
efforts to pacify the Philippines. While the use of such techniques has certainly been over-
exaggerated due to the sensational nature of the tactics employed, they were nevertheless 
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employed and rarely were the perpetrators of such actions punished.114 The use of such 
tactics by some of the soldiers eventually served to sensationalize the conflict and distract the 
public and many people from other aspects of the Philippine-American War.115 
 The success of the United States was far from certain as the conflict dragged on. One 
of the most infamous episodes of the conflict was the ambush of the United States forces at 
the coastal town of Balangiga. The populace was seemingly docile and welcoming of the 
United States presence there, and the mayor had invited the Army there for protection.116 
Unbeknownst to the United States soldiers stationed there, this turned into a ploy to get the 
soldiers to let their guard down for an eventual attack against them. This attack was 
retaliation for several instances of misconduct including theft and a rape.117 Prior to the 
attack, the townspeople had concealed weapons and insurgents to prepare for the attack. On 
the morning of September 28, 1901, while the men of Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry 
were getting breakfast, the townspeople and the insurgents attacked. Because the men were 
getting breakfast, most of them were unarmed there was only a light guard stationed to 
protect the men.118 What resulted was a complete defeat of the United States forces. As the 
rebels attacked the United States soldiers, they used the bolo knife with grisly consequences. 
As the attack unfolded, surviving soldiers retreated towards the ocean and then fled in boats 
towards the nearest United States outpost.119 When news of the attack reached the United 
States forces in the Philippines, a great deal of worry ensued. Telegrams were sent to 
outposts informing them of what had transpired at Balangiga and warming them to be 
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prepared for possible attacks against their outposts.120 The resultant retribution by the United 
States was swift and destructive. The United States troops destroyed the town so that, “with 
the exception of the stone walls of the church and a few large upright poles of some of the 
houses, there is today not a vestage [sic] of the town of Balangiga left.121 
 Balangiga was one of the few episodes of the Philippine-American War when the 
United States used punitive measures to wage the conflict. The United States did not make a 
policy of taking punitive measure against the civilian populace. Rather, the United States 
forces in the Philippines were more concerned with treating the populace fairly, instituting 
civil services, and showing the populace that the soldiers were “representatives of a high 
civilization.”122 An exception to this was when General Joseph Smith wanted his men to turn 
Samar into a “howling wilderness” in order to pacify the island and punish the inhabitants for 
their continued intransigence.123 
 Despite the defeat at Balangiga, the United States suffered relatively few major 
setbacks during its campaign in the Philippines. By the end of the conflict, the overwhelming 
majority of the resistance to the United States had ceased. Despite the ending of the conflict 
against Aguinaldo and his rebels, the United States had to continue to deal with other 
insurrections and uprisings in the Philippines. On the island of Samar, the United States had 
to contend with a religious cult known as the Pulahanes, who lived in the mountains and 
launched attacks against the United States and the coastal towns of the Island.124 The United 
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States was eventually able to subdue the Pulahanes by employing many of the same tactics 
and strategies that they had employed against Aguinaldo and his rebels.125  
 After the United States had defeated the numerous rebellions that had taken place in 
the Philippines, the process of governing the islands and settling in for a term as the colonial 
rulers of the islands began. The United States constructed numerous military bases to protect 
the newly acquired possession.126 The United States granted the Philippines their 
independence in 1946.127 The efforts of the soldiers that fought in the Philippine-American 
War paved the way for a half century of rule by the United States. This rule could be 
described as far more benevolent than that of the European powers that had colonized the rest 
of the world long before the United States had acquired an overseas empire. While the 
colonial rule of the United States could be called benevolent, especially when compared to 
that of other colonial powers, it is still important to remember that the United States ruled 
over a group of people without that peoples’ permission and had done so through conquest 
and the use of military power and arms to do so. 
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Chapter 2: Irregular War After Empire 
After the Philippine-American War, the United States became involved in the Banana 
Wars, where similar tactics and strategies were used. The Banana Wars were military 
interventions undertaken to support regimes that the United States wanted to keep in power 
or remove regimes that were working in a manner contrary to the interests of the United 
States.  This series of conflicts lasted from the late nineteenth century through the 1930s. 
These conflicts were predominantly characterized by small-scale interventions by the United 
States using primarily Marines and Navy personnel. Like the Philippine-American War, the 
United States was often fighting against guerillas operating from the countryside. To combat 
these irregular forces, the United States used small units, like in the Philippines, to root out 
the guerilla forces. Infrastructure improvements were also an important strategy used to 
project the United States’ power into the interior of these countries. The paternalism of the 
United States was also present in these conflicts through the actions of these interventions, 
such as the running of portions of the governments. There was also changes to the laws of 
these countries, such as the rewriting of the electoral code of Nicaragua. United States 
interventions in Latin America were a common occurrence during the latter years of the 
nineteenth century and prior to the Great Depression in the twentieth century. Interventions 
occurred in Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and many of the other nations in Latin America.128 
These interventions are commonly viewed as benefitting the interests of big business in the 
United States to the detriment of the local inhabitants and governments.  
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One of the primary concerns for the United States’ interventions in Latin America 
was to prevent other world powers from constructing a canal through Central America that 
would connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.129 The construction of a canal would 
drastically shorten the trip between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans and make it much 
safer for ships to do so. Without a canal ships would have to sail around Cape Horn. This trip 
took a great deal of time to complete and was dangerous. If another nation had a canal, then 
the other nation would invite foreign intervention into the Americas by foreign powers, a 
violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States also had commercial interests in 
controlling a canal, as another canal would drive revenue away from the canal constructed by 
the United States.130 
 One of the strategies used by the United States was the use and recruitment of local 
military forces to assist in defeating the guerillas. The most prevalent use of this was in Haiti 
and Nicaragua during the twentieth century. In Haiti, the United States trained local 
inhabitants into a local Gendarmerie, a national police and military force who were then used 
to augment the United States as well as perform civic duties.131 Just like in the Philippines, 
American officers trained and led the Haitians. However, these units would be used by the 
United States as part of their main force and were immensely important to the goals of the 
United States on Haiti.  While the Filipino scouts during the Philippine-American War were 
used to supplement the United States military stationed in the Philippines, they never played 
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the primary role as they did in Haiti or Nicaragua, where they provided a great deal of the 
manpower.132  
 The Haitian Gendarmerie projected United States power throughout Haiti. The 
Gendarmerie undertook the important task of policing rural areas through numerous small 
outposts in the interior of Haiti.133 The United States only deployed a small number of 
Marines to keep order and protect its interests on the island. Unlike the Philippines, where 
the United States deployed tens of thousands of men, only a single Marine brigade was 
deployed to the nation.134 Because the United States was interested in protecting its interests 
in the region and preventing other foreign powers from gaining control and influence in 
Haiti, the United States deployed a small number of troops. Unlike the Philippines, the 
United States did not annex Haiti. Instead, the United States was interested in making the 
government stable to protect its interests and keep out foreign powers.135 The United States’ 
actions in Haiti were very much paternalistic, just as they were in the Philippines. The United 
States ran the financial system, dabbled in the politics of the nation, created a United States 
run military force, and advised the Haitians on how to run their government.136 For example 
the United States ran the customs houses throughout Haiti beginning in September 1915.137 
This paternalistic attitude stemmed in part from the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt 
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Corollary, but the strategies and tactics came from the Philippine-American War that the 
United States recently fought.  
 Just as the United States had contracted infrastructure in the Philippines the same was 
done in Haiti under, the auspices of the Corvée, a system that required the inhabitants to 
perform work for the government or pay a tax to be exempt from the work. During the work, 
the government was obligated to provide food and housing to the workers. However, most 
people could not afford to pay taxes, so the United States gained access to a large pool of 
labor. Through the use of the Corvée, the United States was able to construct a road network 
throughout Haiti that allowed the use of wheeled transport that had recently been unusable on 
the overgrown and dilapidated Colonial French roads.138 
 Like many of the conflicts that the United states would wage in Latin America, the 
United States intervened only after the indigenous government had fallen, was in danger of 
doing so, or the United States desired a change in government. In Nicaragua, the United 
States undertook two major interventions, in 1912 and 1927. The United States occupied 
Haiti from 1915 to 1934., There were also interventions in countries for numerous reasons. 
The pattern exhibited by the United States was one of self-interest and paternalism. When the 
indigenous people showed themselves incapable of ruling themselves, the United States 
intervened and restored order and government to the population. The supervision of elections 
in Nicaragua by the United States highlighted this paternalism. The United States did not 
trust the local government to run the elections, so they supervised the elections. The 1928 
and 1932 elections were supervised by Marines. In addition to supervising the elections, the 
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Nicaraguan election code was rewritten.139 Rather than let the people of these nations decide 
their own fate, the United States intervened and steered the countries in a direction that was 
beneficial to the United States. Just like in the Philippines, when the United States decided to 
colonize the islands because the people were deemed incapable of ruling themselves, the 
United States acted similarly during the its interventions in Latin America. While the United 
States actions were paternalistic, the reason for this paternalism was rooted in self-interest to 
prevent intervention by European powers and keep friendly regimes in power. 
 In Nicaragua, the United States used indigenous forces to augment the forces that 
were deployed. Here the United States used the same strategy as in the Philippines and Haiti. 
United States officers led and trained local soldiers and used them to augment and their own 
forces.140 These local units were used to great effect by the United States because they 
allowed the United States to cover more territory than their limited ground forces could on 
their own. In Nicaragua, these native forces often bore the brunt of the guerilla forces arrayed 
against the United States and the Nicaraguan government.141 Just like Haiti, the United States 
only utilized a small force to provide stability and protect its interests in Nicaragua. Once 
again, because the United States only employed a small number of forces, they had to rely on 
the native populace to augment their forces. Rather than use the local military forces that had 
existed before they arrived, the United States created its own military and police forces to 
replace the original indigenous forces and augment the United States forces deployed there. 
The creation of a new local military under United Sates supervision was done for several 
reasons. One reason was that creating a new military and police force allowed the United 
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Sates to build up the new force in a manner befitting a democratic government. This meant 
that the military was not supposed to take part in politics and serve the state instead of an 
individual. Another reason was that the previous military was incompetent and corrupt, so a 
new force removed this major problem. 
 While the United States had used native and local peoples to help fight its conflicts 
prior to the Philippine-American War; these local soldiers were often used haphazardly and 
without the large scale official use like that in the Philippines and later conflicts. The 
Philippine-American War was the first conflict waged by the United States wherein large 
numbers of the local populace were recruited to fight for the United States for an extended 
period. The United States had used Indian scouts during the wars waged in the Western 
United States against other native tribes. However, these forces served to augment the United 
States Army, never to supplant them as was the case in the conflicts following the 
Philippines.142 During the Philippine-American War, the United States recruited large 
numbers of Filipinos to augment its forces in the Philippines. This practice was repeated 
elsewhere when the United States was waging war in a foreign country. This was the strategy 
used by the United States in Nicaragua, Haiti, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These forces 
turned into permanent establishments that existed for decades. The Philippine Constabulary 
persisted for decades after the official conclusion of the Philippine-American War.143 The 
Constabulary operated in a manner like that of the Filipino Scouts. The Constabulary was 
responsible for maintaining peace on the islands and working with the United States to defeat 
any uprisings and deal with any unrest.144 The Filipino Scouts and the Philippine 
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Constabulary were also led by officers from the United States. This practice was repeated by 
the United States in Nicaragua and Haiti.145 
 The use of local troops highlighted the major shift in the way the United States waged 
irregular conflicts. The use of local troops was meant to ‘help’ that native populace and the 
country the United States was in to become more westernized and have similar ideals to that 
of the United States, especially by imparting the ideal of an apolitical military and police 
force.146 By teaching these westernized values and western military ideals into the native 
forces, the United States had adopted a paternal attitude that was more nuanced than the one 
they had adopted with the Indians in the United States and with Filipinos. Whereas those 
policies were blatantly paternalistic, the new paternalism in use by the United States was less 
blatant, and more nuanced. Instead of trying to convert the savage into a westerner, or 
something other than a savage, the United States was taking people that were already 
civilized, but acting as a guiding force, or father figure to these peoples to help them. 
 Instead of directly subjugating the people of the countries the United States had 
invaded, the United States was working towards bringing the people up and giving them 
good government. Rather than taking territory, the United States was imparting its values and 
mores on less powerful nations and showing them the benefit of the United States’ brand of 
capitalism and democracy. This paternalism would characterize the actions undertaken by the 
United States throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
 When the United States intervened in Nicaragua in the twentieth century, it did so to 
restore stability when the country was undergoing rebellions and instability. When the United 
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States intervened in Haiti, it did so for the same reasons as Nicaragua. By intervening in this 
manner, the United States was able to take advantage of the chaos to force its policies on 
these nations. After intervening, the United States worked towards establishing democratic 
elections in Nicaragua. These elections were based on the American ideal of how an election 
and country should have been run.147 These elections were supervised by the United States 
and were an attempt by the United States to remake Nicaragua in its own image and 
hopefully prevent another situation that would require intervention by the Marines and 
Navy.148 While the attempt in Nicaragua was ultimately unsuccessful, it showcased the 
paternalistic efforts of the United States. Soon after the United States left, the local military it 
had trained took power for itself and ruled the country. The United States had attempted to 
remake Nicaragua, its government, and its military into a smaller version of itself and had not 
succeeded.149 
 While in later conflicts, the United States relied on indigenous forces to help do the 
fighting, they would very rarely be led by United States officers. In Vietnam and later wars, 
the United States would use advisors to help train indigenous forces. These advisors would 
fill some of the same roles as the officers who led local forces in the past. However, these 
officers would very rarely be able to give orders to the local forces they were advising.150 
The use of advisors was prominent during the Vietnam War, where the United States 
deployed large numbers of its soldiers as advisors with the South Vietnamese military to 
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train, advise, and eventually try to create a competent military based on that of the United 
States and other western nations. 
 The same tactics and strategies used in the Philippine-American War and the Banana 
Wars would be employed by the United States during the Vietnam War. While the United 
States did not create and utilize the indigenous military force for its own use, the United 
States still trained and equipped the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the other 
South Vietnamese military forces.151 The South Vietnamese also received a great deal of aid 
from the United States in the form of economic and humanitarian aid in addition to military 
aid.152 The United States began its intervention in South Vietnam by sending military 
advisors to assist the ARVN in their battle against the Viet Cong guerillas and the North 
Vietnamese. Rather than attempt to create an army that was suited to waging a war against an 
insurgent foe, the United States helped equip and create an army that was based on the 
United States military and optimized for fighting a conventional war.153 The United States 
wanted the ARVN and other South Vietnamese forces to fight in a manner similar to that of 
the United States. The senior advisors repeatedly requested that all ARVN units spread 
throughout the countryside be gathered together so they could be trained as a division instead 
of providing security throughout the country.154 
 One of the advisors the United States sent to Vietnam was John Paul Vann, a 
lieutenant colonel in the United States Army. His experiences are portrayed in the book A 
Bright Shining Lie. Vann was one of the advisors sent by the United States to train and advise 
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the ARVN on how to wage their conflict. Vann and the other advisors could do little more 
than advise their ARVN counterparts because the decisions were ultimately left up to the 
ARVN officers. The United States did not believe that the ARVN was able to effectively 
wage a campaign against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese; thus, they had to send 
advisors to give the ARVN a fighting chance. While the ARVN were certainly performing 
poorly against the Viet Cong, the United States’ efforts to assist them were insufficient to 
help the ARVN. This was due to the United States advising the ARVN and organizing their 
military to fight a conventional conflict. The United States also equipped the ARVN to fight 
a conventional conflict. The United States gave the ARVN armored personnel carriers, tanks, 
planes, and helicopters to equip their military. During the battle of Ap Bac, the ARVN used 
American provided M113 armored personnel carriers against the Viet Cong. There were the 
same vehicles as what the US Army was using for its conventional forces.155 All of these 
conventional weapons were given to the ARVN to fight an enemy that could blend into the 
civilian populace. The Viet Cong were best fought in a manner that was different from the 
way the United States was equipping and advising the ARVN on how to wage the conflict.156 
Unlike in the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Haiti, the United States did not directly control the 
ARVN. Thus, the United States advisors were incapable of creating an effective force like 
they had in the Philippines, Nicaragua, or Haiti.  
When Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South Vietnam, was obviously unfit to lead 
South Vietnam and was doing more harm than good, the United States gave the opposition 
elements of the South Vietnamese government approval to launch a coup. This coup deposed 
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and murdered the president, along with other senior members of his government.157 If the 
rulers of South Vietnam would not acquiesce to the wishes of the United States, then the 
United States would have them removed and replaced with someone who would conform. 
After Diem was deposed, South Vietnam suffered from constant coups and changes in 
government that would undermine the stability of the country and the ability of the country to 
fight the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.158 
The construction of roads throughout Vietnam was a priority of both the United 
States and South Vietnamese government. By building roads, the government would be able 
to extend its control throughout the interior of the nation and combat the communist guerillas 
it was facing.159 During the Banana Wars the United States had constructed roads and laid 
telegraph lines, just as it had done in the Philippines. By increasing the mobility of their 
militaries, the United States and its allies planned to extend the reach of their government 
into the interior of the countries. By increasing government control, the guerillas could more 
effectively be combated and maybe even defeated. 
 One of the strategies employed by the United States in Philippine-American War that 
would be replicated during the Vietnam Conflict would be the use small numbers of soldiers 
spread throughout the villages in the countryside. The United States Marine Corps used this 
strategy to great effect soon after they arrived in Vietnam in 1965.160 These units were 
comprised of a small number of Marines and local militia forces who would work together to 
defend a village from the Viet Cong. The actions of one of these units was chronicled in Bing 
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West’s The Village. The Marines would work with the local Popular Forces militia units to 
provide security to the villagers and keep the Viet Cong at bay. One of the ways the Marines 
accomplished this task was by patrolling with the Popular Forces militia they were stationed 
with.161 Just like in the Philippines, the Marines worked to take care of the villages they were 
protecting. They would often work to provide the villages with supplies that were needed for 
numerous projects. In one instance, West and his men secured supplies to help construct a 
school for the village.162 While in the Philippines the officers who were in the villages 
assumed almost complete control over the governance and day-to-day functioning of their 
outposts, in Vietnam the Marines were there to protect the village more so than govern the 
village. 
 The Marines that were stationed in the village worked with the local militia forces to 
provide security to the village. The Marine’s work with the local militia forces hearkened 
back to the Philippine-American War and Banana War when the United States had used 
indigenous forces to augment their own forces. The Popular Forces militia that the Marines 
worked with were trained and commanded by the Marines in a manner like other indigenous 
forces in past conflicts. The Marines and the militia would patrol the village and the 
surrounding area together to deter the Viet Cong and provide security to the village. With the 
combination of local forces and the Marines, the United States was able to use a small 
number of troops to secure the villages and work with the local populace. By using the local 
militia forces, the United States was able to gain local knowledge from the militia as well as 
use them to better understand the local culture, customs, and populace. Unlike the 
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Americans, the local militia were from the village, knew the people in the village, and were 
able to help the Marines in their mission of pacifying the village and its surrounding area.163  
 The use of small forces spread thinly throughout the numerous villages and hamlets 
was not without its risks. Such small units risked being overrun and defeated by superior 
enemy forces. This threat proved itself to the Combined Actions Platoons. One of these 
attacks against the Combined Action Platoons was chronicled in West’s book. In this attack, 
the Viet Cong mustered a large force to attack the Marines and their Popular Forces militia in 
the village they were defending. When the Viet Cong launched their attack, they were able to 
take the Marines and militia by surprise and inflict heavy casualties on the defenders.164 A 
later attack was thwarted when the Marines received intelligence of an impending attack. 
Because of this warning, the Marines and militia disrupted the Viet Cong plans by preparing 
a defense that ruined the element of surprise for the Viet Cong and forced them to call off the 
attack.165 This foiled attack was stopped because the Marines had established a good 
relationship with the villagers, who in turn supplied the Marines with intelligence prior to the 
attack. This information allowed the Marines to use their considerable resources to gather 
intelligence on the planned Viet Cong attack.166 Just like in the Philippines and other 
conflicts, by living among the people and gaining their trust the forces on the ground were 
able to fight an effective battle against the insurgent forces. 
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 Another strategy the South Vietnamese employed was the use of concentration. The 
civilian population in many areas was relocated to fortified hamlets, to separate them from 
the Viet Cong.167 However, this strategy was not successful because the strategy was 
implemented in a haphazard and rapid manner that made it extremely difficult for the 
strategy to succeed. The populace that was being relocated was moved in a rapid manner. 
The civilians were moved so rapidly that the government could not adequately prepare, 
fortify, and provide for the populace that had been moved to these concentration areas. On 
top of this, corruption was rampant among the Vietnamese that were responsible for the 
Strategic Hamlet Program168 Many of the fortified areas were anything but fortified. The 
barbed wire was described as having numerous holes in it, and the local forces that were 
meant to protect the inhabitants were incapable of doing so. Because of this, the Viet Cong 
were able to influence, terrorize, and recruit the civilian populace that was already angry at 
the government for forcing them out of their homes.169 
 While this strategy had proved successful for the United States during the Philippine-
American War. During the Vietnam War the strategy was ineffective. Rather than separating 
the populace from the insurgents, the concentration of the populace in one area gave the Viet 
Cong easy access to the populace. This ease of access to the populace allowed the Viet Cong 
to actively recruit and terrorize the populace. This was because the fortified hamlets were 
insufficiently secured and corruptly run, making the people there easily accessible to the 
insurgents and more willing to aid and join the insurgents.170 The strategy of concentration 
during the Vietnam War had originally come from the British and their experience in 
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Malaya. In Malaya, the British had been hugely successful in implementing the strategy of 
relocation and concentration.171 The United States seemed to have forgotten this strategy 
after the Philippine-American War and only reintroduced it during the Vietnam War after 
receiving the idea from the British ,who had successfully implemented the strategy in 
Malaya.172  
 In a strategy like the mass vaccinations in the Philippines, the United States employed 
inoculation in Vietnam. Many Vietnamese were vaccinated against various diseases, such as 
plague.173 In other cases the United States used vaccine as a tool to prevent outbreaks among 
refugees. The United States also vaccinated refugees against diseases such as Cholera at the 
Refugee Center at Nui Sam Mountain.174 These vaccinations were undertaken under the 
auspices of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United 
States military under Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS). The goal of the 
MEDCAPS was to train the Vietnamese to take over their own medical care and to win over 
the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people.175  
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 The United States also distributed rice and other foodstuffs to the Vietnamese people. 
Often these were supplies that were captured from the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese 
Army. The United States used the distribution of rice as a major propaganda tool in the war. 
The rice was distributed to many civilians throughout Vietnam. Three-hundred tons of rice 
were distributed to refugees in the city of Quang Tri after Operation Maine Crag was 
completed by the Third Marine Division.176 By distributing captured rice rather than 
destroying it, the United States was using another approach to win over the Vietnamese 
people. The capture of rice from the Viet Cong was also used as a propaganda tool to show 
the successes of the United States and its Vietnamese allies.177 By showing the capture of rice 
from the Viet Cong, the United States and the South Vietnamese were showing their 
capability to engage and defeat or at the very least disrupt the operations of the Viet Cong. 
 While the United States employed some strategies and tactics that were like those 
employed during the Philippines, they were often half-heartedly employed in Vietnam, or not 
employed for very long. The strategy of concentration was employed in a rapid, ill-
conceived, and corrupt manner in a way that guaranteed the strategy would fail. In the case of 
the Combined Action Platoons, the strategy proved successful, but it was not implemented 
across a large enough area soon enough to be effective. The United States Army focused 
primarily on conventional combat because the commander in Vietnam, General William 
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Westmorland, believed that the answer to winning was “firepower.”178 Another general said 
that the answer was “more bombs, more shells, more napalm.”179 The use of local forces 
though was somewhat successful, especially in the case of the Combined Action Platoons 
and the use of the Popular Forces militia units. Overall, the United States strategy was one of 
attrition.180 While other conflicts had been waged in this manner, this was not the way the 
United States should have waged the Vietnam War, but it was how the United States fought 
for most of the war. It could be argued that the focus on the conventional war was what was 
responsible for the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. 
 After the Philippine-American War, the United States had several opportunities to 
implement the strategies and tactics that had worked in defeating Emilio Aguinaldo’s 
Filipino revolutionaries. In the case of the Banana Wars, the United States relied heavily on 
local forces that were trained and led by United States military officers. In the Banana Wars 
this strategy was overwhelmingly effective if the United States was leading the local forces. 
However, when the United States left these local forces often turned despotic and corrupt.181 
In the case of Vietnam, the use of local forces was more problematic. In the case of the 
Combined Action Platoons, the use of local forces was successful. When it came to the 
ARVN though, there was far less success. Instead of having the ARVN led by United States 
officers, they were led by Vietnamese officers who did not always heed the advice of their 
American advisors. Unlike the other interventions by the United States, the ARVN did not 
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turn despotic; instead, the ARVN was defeated by the North Vietnamese Army and South 
Vietnam was conquered and united with North Vietnam under communist rule.  
 The overarching theme that connected these actions by the United States was the 
paternalistic nature of the United States actions. The United States intervened in these 
countries to protect the interests of the United States. The raising of local forces, the 
interventions, and the advising were all put into effect because the United States did not trust 
the native inhabitants to “correctly” rule their own country or fight their own conflicts. While 
the United States had less control over the conflict in Vietnam, the control that it did have 
was not implemented correctly nor in a manner that would guarantee the success of the 
United States in Vietnam. 
 The wars the United States waged in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown how the 
United States has exhibited a paternalistic attitude in its relations with other nations. These 
conflicts have also underscored how the United States has continued to use many of the same 
tactics and strategies from the time of the Philippine-American War to these more recent 
conflicts. Many of the successful and unsuccessful strategies used by the United States in the 
Philippine-American War and later conflicts would be used in these more recent conflicts. In 
both nations, the United States invaded, toppled the existing government, and then installed a 
democratic government in the likeness of the United States. The United States did this while 
ignoring the cultural and political differences between these countries and the United States. 
  The United States began the Iraq War by waging a conventional conflict that would 
pit the vastly superior United States military against the Iraqi Army. Just like in the 
Philippine-American War, the United States military had little difficulty defeating the 
conventional Iraqi forces arrayed against them. When the Iraq War transitioned into an 
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irregular conflict, the United States would have to implement many of the same strategies 
that had been implemented in the Philippine-American War and other unconventional 
conflicts waged over the past century. These included training indigenous forces and working 
with them to defeat the insurgents. The forces at the disposal of the United States also 
operated numerous small outposts throughout the country similar to the Philippine-American 
War, Banana Wars, and the Vietnam War. Lastly, the United States used an innovative 
approach to separate and control the populace. For example, a wall was constructed around 
Sadr City, a slum of Baghdad, to control the flow of people, materiel, and goods through the 
city and the ability of insurgent groups to operate.182 The United States also used walls in 
other areas of Baghdad, such as markets, to control the flow of people and protect them from 
vehicle borne attacks.183 
 Unlike the Iraq War, the War in Afghanistan against the Taliban was waged in a more 
unconventional manner from the beginning. Part of the reason for this was that the United 
States feared a reaction in the country like what happened when the Soviet Union invaded 
previously. Rather than sending in large numbers of conventional forces, the United States 
sent in numerous teams of elite soldiers to wage an unconventional conflict, including 
Special Forces,184 CIA operatives, and other special operations units sent to work with the 
Northern Alliance and other indigenous forces to topple the Taliban regime.185 The use of 
these special operations units was a textbook example of how Special Forces were supposed 
to operate. In Northern Afghanistan, Special Forces deployed to assist the Northern Alliance 
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by calling in airstrikes against the Taliban and providing other support.186 These airstrikes 
were the deciding factor in many battles. In the south, the Special Forces met Hamid Karzai, 
the future leader of Afghanistan. The Special Forces worked with Karzai and his supporters 
to capture the city of Kandahar.187 Once again, airstrikes proved to be a major instrument in 
the fight against the Taliban. The Special Forces team was able to gather a large number of 
tribesmen to support their drive towards Kandahar and topple the Taliban.188 
After the fall of the Taliban from power, the United States and its NATO allies set 
about creating a strong central government in Afghanistan. While attempting to create this 
government, the United States was ignoring the culture and political structures of the native 
populace. By ignoring these structures, the United States and its allies allowed tribal 
animosity to flourish, and this caused many tribes and groups to support the Taliban, who 
had turned into an irregular combatant force.189 Mirroring the future situation in Iraq, the 
United States soon found itself engaged in an irregular conflict. In order to combat these 
insurgents, the United States began training indigenous forces to supplement the limited 
forces deployed. The United States would also utilize numerous small outposts to extend 
control over the countryside. These outposts were positioned in many areas, such as the 
remote Korengal Valley.190  
 In Iraq, the United States attempted to implement a democratic government that was 
based on the representative democracy utilized by the United States and many other Western 
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democracies. The problem with this approach, besides its obvious hubris, was that it ignored 
the ethnic and religious divisions that would drive rifts throughout Iraq in the coming years 
of the conflict. Iraq was divided among three major religious sects and ethnic groups, the 
Shia, Sunni, and the Kurds.191 Each of these Islamic religious sects had a long and violent 
history under the rule of Saddam Hussein. The minority Sunni were in power for decades 
under the rule of Hussein, and he used his power to marginalize the majority Shia in Iraq.192 
Hussein also waged a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kurds who lived in the north 
of Iraq using conventional military forces and chemical weapons.193 When the United States 
attempted to create a democratic government in Iraq, these religious divisions were ignored. 
By ignoring these divisions, the United States paved the way for a civil war in Iraq that 
would rage out of control until after the United States implemented the Surge in 2007.194 The 
Surge was an increase of 20,000 men to Iraq, primarily in Baghdad, to quell the rampant 
insurgency and civil war in the country.  
 The United States maintained a mindset that was focused on conventional warfare 
during the first years of the conflict in Iraq, even though the United States was engaged in a 
conflict against an insurgent foe waging an unconventional conflict. The United States was 
largely treating the conflict as a conventional war that could be solved using conventional 
tactics and strategies. The United States kept its troops stationed in large bases in the cities 
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and then eventually on even larger base outside of the cities.195 The United States sent patrols 
into the cities from the large bases, and then the patrols would abandon the city at night 
leaving it in the hands of the insurgents.196 This strategy did not allow the United States to 
control the population or protect those who would have helped them against the insurgents by 
providing information to the United States and its allies. 
 During this time of a conventional mindset, the United States trained a new Iraqi 
Army after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army that had existed 
under Saddam Hussein.197 This new army was trained and created along the lines of the 
United States Army. Unlike the ARVN, the army that the United States created focused 
primarily on internal security operations. Like Vietnam, these units would not be led by 
United States personnel. Instead, the Iraqi Security Forces would only be advised by the 
United States. These Iraqi Security Forces units were mentored by teams from the United 
States military.198 Many of these Iraqi units were also stationed with units from the United 
States to create a more effective partnership and mentoring process to prepare the Iraqis for 
the eventual departure of the United States.199 
 One of the tactics employed by the United States after the conventional strategies had 
failed was the use of smaller numbers of soldiers deployed in small outposts throughout 
major population centers. This strategy was employed in numerous cities across Iraq with 
mixed results. One of the most successful iterations of this strategy was in in the city of 
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Ramadi, where Colonel Sean MacFarland deployed his units in numerous outposts 
throughout the city “one neighborhood at a time rather than seizing numerous combat 
outposts in one fell swoop.”200 MacFarland worked in a gradual and efficient manner to 
regain control of the city from insurgents that had taken control of the city away from the 
Iraqi government.201 MacFarland was an important figure because he was one of the most 
effective individuals to combat the insurgency. As MacFarland’s troops were being deployed 
throughout the city, the tribal elders in the area began to trust the United States forces or see 
the United States as a better alternative to the insurgents. These tribal elders banded together 
and worked with the United States to form an alliance against the insurgents in Ramadi and 
the surrounding areas. This movement became known as the Anbar Awakening.202 With the 
forces stationed in small outposts throughout the city and the cooperation of the tribal elders 
and their tribes, the United States was able to deal a major blow to the insurgency in Ramadi. 
These actions also increased the size and confidence of the Iraqi Army and police units 
stationed in the city.203 
 One of the major goals of the Surge in 2007 was to create a massive influx of troops 
into the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. Surge was the term used to describe this massive influx of 
soldiers and Marines. Before the Surge, a civil war raged between the various political and 
religious sects throughout the city with Shia and Sunni killing each other. Some police 
commandos even acted as Shia death squads.204 In order to accomplish the goal of defeating 
the insurgency and ending the sectarian violence, the United States deployed 20,000 
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additional troops to provide security in the capital.205 The Surge also extended the tours of 
many other units already deployed past the normal twelve-month rotation.206 One of the 
centerpieces of this new strategy was the same as that employed by MacFarland in Ramadi. 
The United States deployed its additional forces in small outposts to provide security to the 
population of Baghdad. Some of the soldiers employed in this strategy were sent to the 
Baghdad slum of Sadr City, a predominately Shia area that had been an epicenter of the 
insurgent movement against the coalition forces and the Iraqi government. One of the 
primary reasons for this was the presence of Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army, a personal 
militia that answered to Sadr and ran many neighborhoods in Sadr City. This group had been 
responsible for much of the violence in Baghdad prior to the Surge but would not be as active 
during the Surge to avoid being dismantled by the new forces sent as a part of the Surge.207  
One of the infantry battalions deployed to Sadr City was at the heart of the battle for 
this slum of Baghdad. This battalion, the 2-16 Infantry, was deployed in a large compound in 
Sadr City as part of the Surge and would take part in the attempt to pacify Sadr City. The 
battalion then began to set up small outposts near their main base to regain control of Sadr 
City from the insurgents that had reigned over the slum before the Surge. By deploying some 
of their forces in small outposts inside the city, the battalion’s goal was to protect the 
populace and deny the insurgents access to the populace.208 This Army unit also worked with 
the indigenous security forces as the United States had done in numerous conflicts before and 
during the war in Iraq.209 The battalion was not stationed in Sadr City long enough to see the 
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effects of their efforts, but while there the battalion did not meet with much success. To the 
men of the battalion and their commander, the situation they were leaving behind for their 
replacements was the same, or worse than, when they had arrived over a year earlier.210 
 One of the early successful attempts to restore stability and governance in Iraq was in 
Mosul shortly after the capitulation of the Hussein regime. After the fall of Baghdad, General 
David Petraeus had a brigade of his 101st Airborne Division board helicopters and fly to the 
city of Mosul in a massive air assault.211 Once the division arrived, Petraeus began the 
process of governing the city. As his predecessors had done in Manila during the Philippine-
American War, Petraeus resumed many of the civil services and attempted to restore the city 
to a state comparable to prior to the invasion. Petraeus resumed the collection of garbage, 
classes at the university in Mosul, opened and guarded infrastructure, and instituted local 
government.212 For example, Petraeus had his soldiers posted at gas stations in order to 
ensure the orderly flow of traffic and provide protection to these areas.213 Petraeus also had 
his men spread throughout the city in order to provide security to the population and make 
the presence of his soldiers felt. The situation in Mosul was relatively peaceful compared to 
the rest of Iraq during this time-period. Whereas other cities and regions in the country were 
overwhelmed with violence, the levels of violence in Mosul were low and people were able 
to live their lives in a far better situation when compared to the rest of Iraq.214 While Petraeus 
was using his forces in a counterinsurgency strategy, many other commanders were having 
their units work in a conventional manner throughout Iraq that fueled the insurgency.215 
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Petraeus used his soldiers in a manner like commanders during the Philippine-American War 
and was seeing positive results because of it. 
 Another commander who was using similar tactics was Colonel Peter R. Mansoor in 
Baghdad. Mansoor deployed his limited forces of the 1st brigade of the 1st Armored Division. 
in the best manner he could. Mansoor attempted to create relationships with the locals to 
create the trust that was necessary for him to combat the insurgent and criminal elements that 
had appeared after the fall of Saddam and the Baathist regime.216 Mansoor also wanted to 
keep his forces stationed inside Baghdad to provide the security that was necessary for the 
coalition to defeat the growing insurgency.217 The inclusion of indigenous forces was a major 
program undertaken by Mansoor and the United States shortly after the invasion. The United 
States employed many Iraqis to help guard key infrastructure and locations that the United 
states was too undermanned to guard with its own forces.218 The Army also employed 
numerous individuals from the surrounding neighborhoods as cooks and cleaning staff.219 
This provided an economic boost to the local populace and helped the United States gain the 
trust, or at least cooperation of some of the local populace. 
After the Vietnam War, the United States did not attempt to forcibly relocate entire 
populations of people to defeat an insurgency. Instead, the United States implemented a 
different strategy based off the same idea. Rather than relocate a large group of people into 
one area to cut them off from the insurgents, a strategy which was infeasible in Baghdad, the 
United States adopted a novel approach to this strategy. The strategy the United States 
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undertook was to build a walled off area of Baghdad to control the movement of insurgents 
through the city. The strategy was simple. The United States would construct a concrete 
barrier surrounding a portion of Sadr City where a large portion of the insurgent activity was 
occurring.220 The premise was the same as earlier relocation efforts but undertaken in a 
different manner. The construction of a wall would separate the insurgents from the civilian 
population. The wall would also control the flow of people and materiel to different sectors 
of Baghdad. By doing this, the insurgents would be hampered in their attempts to undermine 
the Iraqi government and terrorize the civilian population. This strategy also kept the 
insurgents confined in a smaller area that would allow the United States military to 
concentrate its manpower on this area. 
 The implementation of a strong central government in Afghanistan was another 
instance like the implementation of a central government in Iraq. The United States ignored 
or was ignorant of the ethnic and cultural problems this would bring. The plan was 
undertaken without due consideration to the different cultures, ethnic groups, and tribes in 
Afghanistan. The implementation of a strong government in Afghanistan was particularly 
fraught with peril because many of the tribes that inhabited the mountainous regions of 
Afghanistan were reluctant at best, outright hostile at worst, to a strong central government in 
Afghanistan. Prior to the overthrow of the Afghan government by the communist party in 
Afghanistan in 1979, the country had been relatively peaceful. After the overthrow by the 
communist and during the Soviet-Afghan War the country suffered years of warfare.221 After 
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the Soviet-Afghan War, the country was wracked by constant civil war and conflict between 
different political and ethnic groups.  
 The United States undertook a training mission in Afghanistan similar to that in Iraq 
and the earlier attempt in Vietnam. The United States attempted to create a modern military 
to assist the coalition mission in Afghanistan. This new military force was trained by the 
United States and its coalition partners. The different nations of the coalition undertook 
different roles in the advising mission. The British trained the noncommissioned officers of 
the Afghan Army, the French trained the general staff, and other nations helped train the 
army in other areas.222 In order to equip the Afghan Army, the United States and its coalition 
allies equipped the force with the leftover Soviet equipment that was in plentiful supply in 
Afghanistan and donated equipment from Eastern European nations.223 The advising of these 
units met with varying degrees of success. In some cases, the units the United States 
partnered with proved themselves capable soldiers and more than qualified to fight the 
insurgents arrayed against them. In other cases, the opposite was true. 
 During Operation Medusa, an operation to retake the Panjwayi Valley from the 
Taliban, a United States Special Forces team was partnered with a battalion of Afghan 
commandos in 2006.224 The Special Forces team worked closely with this unit and used them 
to great effect during the battles that were to come. During the battle for the valley, a 
Canadian task force was ordered to take an insurgent held area.225 When the Canadians 
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encountered stiff resistance from the insurgents, the Special Forces team and their Afghan 
counterparts moved to assist the Canadians in their attack. They did this by moving to take an 
area of elevated terrain to call in airstrikes and control the surrounding area.226 On their way 
to assist the Canadians by taking control of this hill, the Special Forces were ambushed by 
the insurgents. During this battle, the Special Forces and their Afghan counterparts were 
forced to retreat and resupply.227 However, the Special Forces and their Afghan commandos 
worked together to attack the insurgents again and support the Canadian offensive against the 
Taliban in the area by capturing and holding the hill.228 The partnering of United States and 
indigenous forces is like the Philippines when the United States soldiers worked closely with 
local scouts and police against the insurgent forces with a great deal of success. 
 Another instance where the United States partnered its forces to work with Afghan 
forces was in the north of the country. Here a platoon of infantry from the 10th Mountain 
Division was tasked with supporting a group of Afghan Border Police. When the platoon 
went to meet the Afghan police, they discovered the atrocious state that the unit was in. The 
Afghan Border Police unit completely lacked discipline, and their commander was corrupt, 
selling his unit’s weapons on the black market where they would end up in the hands of the 
insurgents.229 The compound the Afghans were stationed in was filthy, with human 
excrement scattered on the ground, and the entire unit being completely unfit for combat or 
any sort of professional police work.230 It came as no surprise to the platoon that when the 
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insurgents launched an attack against the outpost it was overrun ,and the Afghan Border 
Police were defeated soundly by the insurgents.231 
 When the United States found itself fighting an unconventional war during the 
twenty-first century, it used the same tactics it had employed more than a century earlier in 
the Philippine-American War. The United States took a paternalistic approach in the 
countries they had invaded. These nations were also reconstituted based on the idea that 
American ideal of liberty and democracy were the best forms of government. The United 
States also created a military force that was created to be similar its own and not necessarily 
what was best suited to combat the irregular warfare the United States would be dealing with. 
Another strategy that carried across the century was the use of small units spread throughout 
the cities and towns of the country. A final strategy employed was that of separating the 
civilian populace from the insurgents and controlling the movement of the people and goods. 
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Conclusion 
 The way the United States waged war over the century from the Philippine-American 
War to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan maintained many similarities. The United States 
waged its irregular conflicts in a manner that was similar throughout these conflicts. The 
primary motivator in these conflicts was the idea of the United States acting as a benevolent 
force and adopting a paternalistic attitude in its dealings with the indigenous inhabitants of 
the nations involved in these conflicts. The United States used indigenous forces in each of 
these conflicts that were trained and led or advised by the United States. These indigenous 
forces played a significant role in each of these conflicts, although the way they were used 
differed greatly. In the case of the Philippines, these indigenous forces were never the main 
fighting force. Rather, they served to augment the United States forces that were deployed to 
the islands to pacify the new colony of the United States. In Nicaragua and Haiti, the local 
forces there served a pivotal role in allowing the United States to not send large numbers of 
troops to the conflicts and even draw down the number of troops in these countries by 
replacing them with local forces.232 In Vietnam, the United States helped train and advise the 
ARVN and the other South Vietnamese security forces. The United States wanted these 
forces to be modeled after their own military because the United States was more concerned 
about a conventional conflict with an invasion from the North Vietnamese, much like what 
had happened with the Korean War.233 The United States followed a similar strategy in Iraq 
and Afghanistan by creating a new indigenous military trained and advised by the United 
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States. The plan was that these new militaries would be able to effectively take over security 
duties from the United States and its allies. 
 Another key characteristic of the way the United States waged irregular warfare was 
through the use of small outposts placed throughout the territory they wanted to control. In 
the Philippines, the United States used this strategy to great effect by having its soldiers 
stationed in many of the towns and by having the men in charge of these outposts perform 
many of the functions of a civic government. In the case of Nicaragua, the United States 
Marines did the same. One Marine detachment was attacked by Sandino and only saved by 
the use of airplanes to drop bombs and strafe the guerillas.234 With the use of Combined 
Action Platoons in Vietnam, the United States continued the use of the strategy of small units 
being placed in numerous outposts. While certainly not without risks, this strategy was far 
more effective than the grandiose search and destroy missions employed by much of the 
military. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States once again used this 
strategy. In Iraq, this strategy came to the fore during the Surge. The Surge was successful in 
ending the civil war that had erupted in Baghdad and brought stability to the Iraqi capital.235 
In other cities throughout Iraq, such as Ramadi, the strategy was used with great success and 
worked in conjunction with the Anbar Awakening to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. With Major 
Jim Gant in Afghanistan, his small team was able to effectively work with the native 
populace and gain their loyalty and acceptance, which allowed him to effectively combat the 
Taliban and other insurgent forces in Afghanistan. 
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 With each of these conflicts, the United States brought along the vestiges of life on a 
base in the United States. On the island of Samar at Tarangman, a post exchange was present 
and had an athletic field and a pool table. In Vietnam, the bases the United States built had 
many of the comforts of home, such as ice cream and other creature comforts. The trend 
continued with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The major bases had fast food and post 
exchanges as well as other establishments that would have been more at home in a town, city, 
or base in the United States.  
 Even though the United States used the same strategies throughout all these conflicts, 
the overarching mindset in each of these conflicts was the idea of the United States as a 
benevolent and paternalistic actor. With the Philippines, the natives were considered 
“uncivilized” and incapable of ruling themselves. The United States also did not want 
another foreign power to annex the Islands after the United States and Filipino 
Revolutionaries had defeated the Spanish in the Philippines.236 In the case of the Banana 
Wars, the United States intervened in Haiti and Nicaragua to instill stability and protect its 
interests in the two countries. In the case of both countries, the United States worked towards 
instituting a more democratic government and instilling the populace with some of the 
tenants of an American democracy. A new electoral code was drafted for Nicaragua by the 
United States to fulfill the goal of instituting good government.237 The customs service of 
Haiti was taken over by the United States so the Haitians could repay their debt, which they 
had not been able to do on their own.238 When it came to Vietnam, the United States once 
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again attempted to instill in the country a democratic spirit. With Iraq, the United States 
assumed that once Saddam Hussein had been defeated the people would willingly embrace 
democracy and silently acquiesce to the new regime. Because of this belief, the United States 
had almost no planning in place for Iraq after the Iraqi Army was defeated and the United 
States had control over the country.239 The United States also had a similar mindset in 
Afghanistan. The United States attempted to impart a western democracy in the country and 
assumed that they would meet with little to no resistance to the imposition of western ideas 
and values on a largely tribal society. This was far from the case, and many in Afghanistan 
were against the idea of a strong western style government in the country. 
 The United States acted in a similar manner in all these conflicts. When it came to 
irregular warfare, the United States adopted the same strategies to combat the insurgent or 
guerilla enemy they were facing. In the case of the larger conflicts, the United States began 
the conflicts in a conventional manner to fight a conventional enemy. When the conflict 
transitioned to irregular warfare, the United States had difficulty adapting to the new conflict. 
This problem was most prevalent in Iraq when the military refused to change its strategy to 
face a new irregular threat. Instead, the military kept its troops stationed in large bases on the 
periphery of the cities instead of spreading its forces throughout the cities to control the 
population. In Vietnam, the United States followed the same strategy. 
 Overall, the United States’ efforts over the past century in irregular conflict can be 
characterized by the use of the same, or similar, strategies that have proven effective. The 
only problem with the implementation of these strategies is that there has often been a long 
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period where the United States had not implemented these strategies until later in the 
conflicts. The main reason for the United States actions had been the misguided idea that the 
United States is superior and is helping, or liberating, the inhabitants of these countries. This 
attitude has led to a paternalistic and benevolent attitude that has caused the United States to 
become involved in many conflicts with misguided beliefs about the countries they were 
invading, assisting, or “liberating.” This paternalistic attitude has led to a lack of planning for 
the aftermath of these conflicts and a complete lack of understanding of the populace of these 
countries. In addition to this lack of understanding of the populace, the United States also 
lacked the knowledge to effectively work with the native inhabitants to create a government 
and other institutions that would be able to effectively rule in these countries. 
 For future research, a different approach would be to include the opinions of the 
indigenous populations in the countries that the United States had invaded or assisted. 
Another approach would be to investigate the attitudes of the civilian populace in the United 
States and see how that compared to the attitudes exhibited by the military and civilian 
leadership in the United States. Did the civilian populace share largely similar ideals as the 
military and leadership? Did this change as the conflict progressed? Another way to 
investigate these conflicts would be to research the way these conflicts are viewed by the 
populations of these countries after the conflicts have ended as well as during these conflicts. 
Future research could look at a longer period of time and examine how the United States 
waged warfare from the colonial times to the most recent conflicts. Another way to examine 
these conflicts would be to compare how the United States and other nations have waged 
these conflicts and then compare the similarities and differences. Along with comparing the 
way different countries waged these conflicts, another useful approach would be to research 
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the different reasons that each country had for becoming involved in these conflicts. A final 
idea for future research would make use of David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Theory and Practice. 240 Galula’s work is held in high regard by many who have practiced 
counterinsurgency warfare. This high regard for Galula’s work makes it important to 
research why it is held in such high regard and to see if Galula made accurate observations 
about counterinsurgency warfare. 
 The United States intervened in numerous small conflicts from the Philippine-
American War to the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States had acted in a 
paternalistic nature that has existed to the present day and throughout the intervening 
conflicts. This attitude has led to a sense of superiority in the United States actions in these 
countries, and this attitude has led to numerous difficulties and a lack of planning. This 
superiority makes it seem as if the United States was more willing to become involved in 
more conflicts in order to exercise this paternalism because it views itself as being the only 
nation or the nation best able to deal with these conflicts. 
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